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Shumate: The Constitutionality of the Ohio Guest Statute

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
THE OHIO GUEST STATUTE
There is one impact of talent, genius,
and excellence uniformly manifested in
whatever fields they occur: they make
fine fire furnishing creative insights
for others working in the same areas.1

T

IS IS THE MANNER in which one writer described the court opinion
2
written by Mr. Justice Tobriner in Brown v. Merlo, the California
Supreme Court decision which declared the California automobile guest
statute unconstitutional. In Brown an automobile guest, alleging both
willful misconduct and negligence, brought an action against his host
driver for injuries received in an automobile accident which occurred on
a California highway. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment holding that the state automobile guest statute barred
recovery since the plaintiff failed to prove that the accident was caused
3
by the driver's willful misconduct or intoxication. The plaintiff-guest
appealed from the summary judgment, contending that4 the statute5
conflicted with the equal protection clauses of both the state and federal
constitutions. The California Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff,
asserting that the classifications set forth in the statute "do not bear a
the
substantial and rational relation to the statute's purposes of protecting
'6
hospitality of the host-driver and of preventing collusive lawsuits."
Since Brown, four other state courts have declared their state's

1 The Association of Trial Lawyers of America, NEWSLETTER, Vol. 17, No. 2 at 52
(1974).
28 Cal. App. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Brown].
s This was the standard of proof established by the California Automobile Guest
Statute, CAL. VER. CODE § 17158 (West 1971):
No persons riding in or occupying a vehicle owned by him and driven by
another person with his permission and no person who as a guest accepts a ride
in any vehicle upon a highway without giving compensation for such ride, nor
any other person, has any right of action for civil damages against the driver
of the vehicle or against any other person legally liable for the conduct of the
driver on account of personal injury to or the death of the owner or guest
during the ride, unless the plaintiff in any such action establishes that the
injury or death proximately resulted from the intoxication or willful misconduct
of the driver.
4
CAL. CONsr.art. 1 §§ 11,21.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
6 Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. App. 3d at 882, 506 P.2d at 231, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 407
(1973).
[135]
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automobile guest statute unconstitutional. 7 Each of these courts based
their decision primarily upon the rationales set forth in Brown. 8 The Ohio
automobile guest statute9 is quite similar to the now unconstitutional
California, Kansas and North Dakota statutes. The following discussion
will examine the proffered justifications of the Ohio statute in light of the
constitutional arguments that have been raised in these recent decisions.
THE HISTORY OF AUTOMOBILE GUEST STATUTES
Before delving into an analysis of the Ohio guest statute, 10 it becomes
necessary to first discuss the historical development of guest statutes
generally. According to common law principles, the owner of an
automobile owes a guest the duty to use ordinary care in the operation
of his automobile."
The typical automobile guest statute, however, relieves the owner or
operator of an automobile from liability for injury to non-paying
passengers unless caused by some form of aggravated misconduct.u
Connecticut enacted the first such statute in 1927 and two years later
in Silver v. Silver,13 its constitutionality was upheld by the United States
Supreme Court. 4 Since the decision in Silver, guest statutes not wholly
denying a guest the right of action have been held constitutional. 15 Today,

7Henry v. Bauder, 518 P.2d 362 (Kan. 1974); Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771
(N.D. 1974); Clements v. Greenwood, Case No. 73-C-342 (Indiana Clark Cir. Ct.
1974); Putney v. Piper, Case No. 2798 (Dist. Ct. Iowa 1973). For a review of these
court opinions, see The Association of Trial Lawyers of America, NEWsLETrER, Vol.
17, No. 2 at 52 and 91 (1974).
8E.g. in Henry V. Bauder, 518 P.2d 362, 366 (Kan. 1974), the court specifically
stated: "We are impressed with the sound rationale of the opinion of Brown. The
result reached... is reasonable and in accordance with our concept of equal justice
under the law."
9 OHio REviSED CODE ANN. §4515.02 (Page 1953) reads:
The owner, operator or person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle
shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or death of a
guest, resulting from the operation of said motor vehicle, while such guest is
being transported without payment therefor in or upon said motor vehicle, unless
such injuries or death are caused by the willful or wanton misconduct of such
operator, owner, or person responsible for the operation of said motor vehicle.
See note 3 supra.
10 Whenever the author makes reference to guest statutes, he is referring to automobile
guest statutes.
11 Alexander v. Carey, 98 F. Supp. 1013 (D. Alaska 1951); Spivey v. Newman, 232
N.C. 281, 59 S.E.2d 844 (1950); Dickerson v. Connecticut Co., 98 Conn. 87, 118 A.
518 (1922); 2 HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 16.15 at 950 (1956); White,
The Liability of an Automobile Driver to a Non-Paying Passenger, 20 VA. L. REv.
326, 329 (1934).
12 E.g., ALA. CODE tit 36, § 95 (1940) (willful or wanton misconduct); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 49-1401 (1963) (intentional, intoxication, gross negligence); WASH. REv.
CODE § 46-08.080 (1937) (intentional accident, gross negligence, intoxication).
13 280 U.S. 117 (1929) [hereinafter cited as Silver].
14 Connecticut was also the first state to repeal its guest statute, ten years after it was
passed: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1628 (repealed 1937).
15See, e.g., Westover v. Schafler, 205 Kan. 62, 468 P.2d 251 (1970); Naudzius v.
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24 states have statutes limiting the liability of the owner or operator of a

motor vehicle to a guest. 16 Two states, Massachusetts 17 and Georgia, 8
have imposed similar restrictions by judicial decision; while 24 states have
no automobile guest statute and still adhere to the common law rule
requiring that a host exercise reasonable care for the safety of his guests.
Guest statutes were adopted ostensibly as a device to protect the
"good samaritan" host driver and to insulate insurance carriers from
the burdens of collusive suits.' 9 A few writers assert that the series of
automobile guest legislation passed in the late 1920's and 1930's was a
legislative response to the public's outcry over a series of publicized cases
20
in which hitchhikers sought exorbitant damages from their host drivers.
Professor Prosser, however, finds little support for this theory noting that
21
he has had extreme difficulty locating any such decisions. The more
to
be that they
appears
statutes
credible reason for the passage of these
were passed as a result of extensive lobbying by liability insurance
companies. 22 The insurance industry strongly contended that guest statutes
enabled them to offer coverage at a lower premium rate, thereby increasing
the accessibility of liability insurance. 23 Several critics of this contention
argue that there is little, if any, correlation between insurance rates and
the presence or absence of guest statutes. 24 In spite of this underlying

Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N.W. 581 (1931); Corish, The Automobile Guest, 14 Bos.
U.L. REv. 728 (1934); Hodges, The Automobile Guest Statutes, 12 TEx. L. REv. 303
(1934); Weber, Guest Statutes, 11 U. CN. L. REv. 24 (1937).
16 For the most recent, complete listing (excepting California, Kansas, and North
Dakota), see Comment, Judicial Nullification of Guest Statutes, 41 S. CAL. L. Rav.
884, 899-901 (1968).
17Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N.E. 168 (1917) (The court applied the
analogy of the liability for a gratuitous bailment and said, "The measure of liability
of one who undertakes to carry gratis is the same as that of one who undertakes to
keep gratis").
1l Caskey v. Underwood, 89 Ga. App. 418, 79 S.E.2d 558 (1953); Hennon v. Hardin,
78 Ga. App. 81, 50 SXE.2d 236 (1948); Epps v. Parrish, 26 Ga. App. 379, 106
S.E. 297 (1921).
19PRossER, Tie LAW OF TORTS 187 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER];
Furman, The Future of the Automobile Guest Statute, 45 TEMP. L.Q. 432-433 (1972);
Tipton, Florida's Automobile Guest Statute, 11 U. FLA. L. Rav. 287-288 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as Tipton].
20 E.g., Tipton, supra note 19 at 288.
21 PROSSER, supra note 19 at 187 n.8.
22 One author curtly charged that guest statutes are "the most vicious pieces of
legislation an active insurance lobby was able to foist on an unsuspecting public."
Gibson, Guest Statute Discrimination, 6 ALBERTA L. REv. 211, 218 (1968). See
generally, PROssER, supra note 19 at 187; Furman, supra note 19 at 432; Tipton,
supra note 19 at 288.
23 Id.

24 See James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability, 57 YALE
L.J. 549 (1948); Weinstein, Should We Kill the Guest PassengerAct, U. DET. L. REv.
185 (1965); White, The Liability of an Automobile Driver to a Non-Paying
Passenger,20 VA. L. REv. 326 (1934).
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controversy, the courts have almost universally justified the denial of
recovery to the guest for injury occasioned by the ordinary negligence of
his host driver on the theories of protection of the host driver's hospitality
and the fear of collusive suits between the driver and the passenger. 25
As alluded to earlier, the constitutionality of guest statutes was
established early in their history by the United States Supreme Court
when the Connecticut statute was challenged on the grounds of equal
protection. 2 Mr. Justice Stone, speaking for the Court, took notice of
the increasing frequency of litigation in which passengers transported
gratuitously in automobiles sought recovery of large sums from their
driver-hosts for injuries alleged to have been due to negligent operation.27
In addressing the argument of plaintiff that permitting paying passengers
to recover while denying the right to non-paying passengers amounts to
an arbitrary distinction, the Court responded:
Granted that the liability to be imposed upon those who operate any
kind of vehicle for the benefit of a mere guest or licensee is an
appropriate subject of legislative restriction, there is no constitutional
requirement that a regulation, in other respects permissible, must
reach every class to which it might be applied-that the legislature
must be held rigidly to the choice of regulating all or none.2 ,
Another case frequently cited as upholding the constitutionality of
automobile guest statutes is Naudzius v. Lahr.29 In that case, the plaintiff
contended that the Michigan legislature, by abolishing the "right of action
for ordinary negligence," deprived the plaintiff-guest of his right of
property without due process of law."0 The plaintiff further argued that
the act established "unreasonable, arbitrary, and unlawful classes of
persons" by distinguishing between guests in motor cars and guests in
other vehicles, and between gratuitous and paying passengers in the same
situation. 3 ' Notwithstanding these arguments, the Michigan court upheld
the statute on the basis of its underlying purpose: to prevent collusion
between the host and guest against an insurance company, and to prevent

25

E.g., Shea v. Olson, 189 Wash. 143, 155, 53 P.2d 615, 620 (1936):

It has been asserted that collusion frequently takes place between the host and

the guest to establish a case of gross negligence against the host, in order to
fasten liability upon a company by whom the host is insured, that because of a
friendly regard for the guest, and knowing that he himself will not have to pay
the bill anyway, the host is willing to admit and often testify to, a state of facts
other than it actually is and thus deprive the insurance company of the benefit
of a good defense.
26 Silver v.Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929).
27Id. at 122-23.
28 Id. at 123 (emphasis added).
29253 Mich. 216, 234 N.W. 581 (1931) [hereinafter cited as Naudzius].
so ld.at 221, 234 N.W. at 583.
Sl Id.at 222,234 N.W. 583.
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recovery by an ungrateful guest.32 The Naudzius court approved these
purposes, finding that such classifications had their basis in reason.as
THE OHlo GUEST STATUTE
In Smith v. Williams,34 the constitutionality of the Ohio guest statute
was examined for the first time. The action was one for damages for the
wrongful death of plaintiff's decedent who was fatally injured while riding
as a guest in defendant's automobile. The petition alleged that the wanton
misconduct of the defendant caused the fatal injury to the decedent, a
non-paying passenger. The trial judge gave the following charge to the
jury: "If you find that the driver of said automobile at the time and place
in question... was not guilty of any wanton misconduct... then you
must find for the defendant." On appeal, plaintiff contended that the
charge was erroneous as the Ohio guest statute was unconstitutional. In
upholding the lower court decision, the Court of Appeals of Scioto County
asserted that the statute was not repugnant to either article 1, section
19(a) of the Ohio Constitution or the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution.36
The Ohio General Assembly enacted this state's guest statute in
1933.37 Like guest statutes in general, the Ohio provision was enacted
to carry out a policy of "social equity" against gratuitous guests bringing
personal injury actions against "good samaritan motorists. 38 Consistently,
another underlying purpose of the Ohio Guest Statute was to prevent the
possibility of fraud and collusion between social friends and family
39
members to recover from the driver's insurance company.
In construing the meaning of the Ohio statute, the courts have held
that willful misconduct, a finding of which precludes the protection of the
statute, implies an intention or purpose to do wrong, an intentional
deviation from a clear duty or from a definite rule of conduct, and not a
mere error of judgment 40 "Wanton misconduct," a finding of which again
Id. at 224,234 N.W. at 584.
The court analogized the discriminatory treatment to similar distinctions in other
areas such as between the bailee and the bailor, the common carrier and the ordinary
driver, and the innkeeper and the social host. 253 Mich. at 226-27, 234 N.W. at 584
(1931).
3451 Ohio App. 464, 1 N.E.2d 643 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Smith].
35 Id. at 465, 1 N.E.2d at 644.
36 Id. at 467-68,1 N.E.2d at 645. See also Rector v. Hyer, 35 Ohio L. Abs. 451, 41
N.E.2d 886 (1941).
37 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4515.02 (Page 1953) (formerly § 6309-6 GEN. CODE).
See note 9 supra.
S8Miller v. Fairley, 141 Ohio St. 327, 48 N.E. 217 (1943). See text accompanying
notes 19-25 supra.
9 Thomas v. Herron, 20 Ohio St. 2d 62, 67, 253 N.E.2d 772, 775 (1969); Kitchens
v. Duffield, 149 Ohio St. 500, 503, 79 N.E.2d 906, 908 (1949).
40Bailey v. Brown, 34 Ohio St. 2d 62, 295 N.E.2d 672 (1973); Schultz v. Fible, 71
Ohio App. 353, 48 N.E.2d 899 (1943); Cousins v. Booksbaum, 51 Ohio App. 150, 200
N.E. 133 (1935).
32

33
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would preclude operation of the statute, has been construed as such
conduct that manifests a "disposition to perversity"1 and from the
surrounding circumstances and existing conditions, it must be shown that
the party was aware that his conduct would in all probability result in
injury.4 A "guest," within the meaning of the statute, is one who is
invited either directly or by implication to enjoy the hospitality of the
driver, and who takes a ride either for his own pleasure or business,
without making any return to or conferring any benefit upon the driver."
From the plain meaning of the statute, it appears clear that in order
for a passenger to recover for injuries, it must be shown either that the
person being transported is a "guest" and his injuries resulted from
the willful or wanton misconduct of his host motorist, or that the plaintiff
who seeks to recover for the host
is a "passenger for payment"
motorist's negligence." Notwithstanding this apparently unambiguous
language, the guest statute has not been applied in a consistent manner,
and the Ohio courts have been erratic and arbitrary in delineating the
situations where the statute does and does not apply. For example, in
Angel v. Constable,4 a passenger who was being transported home for

41Jenkins v. Sharp, 140 Ohio St. 80, 83, 42 N.E.2d 755, 756 (1943): "Such a
disposition of mental state is shown by a person, when, notwithstanding his conscious
and timely knowledge of an approach to an unusual danger and of common probability of injury to others, he proceeds into the presence of the danger, with indifference
to consequences and absence of all care." See generally Akers v. Stirn, 136 Ohio St.
245, 25 N.E_2d 286 (1940); Morrow v. Hume, Admx., 131 Ohio St. 319, 3 N.E.2d 39
(1936); Universal Concrete Pipe Company v. Bassett, 130 Ohio St. 567, 200 N.E.
843 (1936)); Kennard v. Palmer, 39 Ohio L. Abs. 429, 53 N.E.2d 652 (Ct. App.
1943), rev'd on other grounds, 143 Ohio St. 1, 53 N.E.2d 908 (1944).
42See Sullivan v. Bruce, 250 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1957); Vecchio v. Vecchio, 131
Ohio St. 59, 1 N.E.2d (1936); Reserve Trucking Company v. Fairchild, 128 Ohio
St. 519, 191 N.E. 745 (1934); Haacke v. Lease, 35 Ohio L. Abs. 381, 41 N.E.2d
590 (Ct. App. 1941).
43Peleps v. Oliver, 165 Ohio St. 493, 137 N.E.2d 676 (1956); Dorn v. North
Olmsted, 133 Ohio St. 375, 14 N.E.2d 11 (1938); Bailey v. Neale, 63 Ohio App. 62,
25 N.E.2d 310 (1939); Beer v. Beer, 52 Ohio App. 276, 3 N.E.2d 702 (1935);
Ackerman v. Steiner, 44 Ohio L. Abs. 600, 59 N.E.2d 950 (Ct. App. 1944).
Duncan v. Hutchison, 139 Ohio St. 185, 39 N.E.2d 140 (1942), the Ohio
4In
Supreme Court attempted to prescribe certain tests to determine when one is actually
a "passenger for payment" and thus takes himself out of the operation of a statute:
1) when the automobile host has a financial or business interest in the time or
service of the occupant, and the purpose of the transportation is to take the
occupant to or from his place of employment;
2) when the occupant is making the trip to assist the automobile host in
arriving at the latter's destination or to perform some service for the
latter's benefit;
3) when a substantial or tangible benefit is conferred upon the automobile host;
4) when the automobile host and occupant embark upon a joint adventure or
enterprise in which both are equally interested, and payment is the motivating influence in providing for the transportation;
5) when the person is an involuntary occupant of the automobile.
45See, Burrow v. Porterfield, 171 Ohio St. 28, 168 N.E.2d 137 (1967); Onto REv.
CoDE ANN. § 4515.02 (Page 1953).
4840 Ohio L. Abs. 1, 57 N.E.2d 86 (Ct. App. 1943).
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dinner so that he might work overtime for the driver-host was considered
a "passenger for payment" by the court and thereby not barred from
recovery by the guest statute. However, under a similar circumstance, in
which a passenger had been asked by the host-driver to ride with him
on a trip because the host-driver needed an experienced driver to
accompany him, the court held that the passenger was a "guest," and the
guest statute was a bar to any recovery for ordinary negligence in
operation. 47 These inconsistent results occurred despite the fact that the
well-settled rule in Ohio is that where the passenger confers a benefit
upon the host-driver, he should be considered a "passenger for payment"
thus falling outside the guest statute. 48 While the former court followed
the established rule, the latter court apparently ignored it.
Another glaring inconsistency in application has occurred in applying
the guest statute to "car pools." In 1958, the Ohio Supreme Court
declared that in a "car pool" situation, the plaintiff qualified as a
"passenger for payment." 49 Inconsistently, however, in 1967, an Ohio
Court of Appeals held that the passenger in the "car pool" situation
qualified as a "guest" and fell within the statute.50 Similarly, Ohio courts
have applied questionable "exceptions" to the application of the guest
statute. One Ohio court concluded that a passenger who had both feet in
a stopped car was outside the operation of the statute; 5' another court
held that a passenger who had 'both feet in a moving car was within the
statute; 52 while a third court asserted that a passenger who had one foot
in the moving car and one foot out was outside the statute. 53 Undoubtedly,
it was this sort of questionable reasoning which led one writer to refer to
5 4
the Ohio guest statute as a "treadmill to confusion."
ATTACKING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GUEST STATUTES
Since the recent state court decisions which overturned the guest
statutes used Brown as their primary basis, this author will also use this
decision as the focal point for analysis of the Ohio statute.m The constitutional attack of automobile guest statutes must begin with an analysis of
the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection and conclude
with a critical evaluation of the two announced justifications of guest
statutes-protection of hospitality and prevention of fraud and collusion.M
47

Sabo v. Mayn, 103 Ohio App. 113, 144 N.E.2d 248 (1956).
48 See accompanying text and cases cited in notes 43 and 44 supra.
49 Lisner v. Faust, 168 Ohio St. 346, 155 N.E.2d 59 (1958).

5

oMeier v. Edwards, 11 Ohio App. 2d 224,229 N.E.2d 758 (1967).

51 Lewis v. Woodland, 101 Ohio App. 442, 140 N.E.2d 322 (1957).
52 Kilgore v. U-Drive-It Co., 149 Ohio St. 505, 79 N.E.2d 908 (1948).
53
Clinger v. Duncan, 166 Ohio St. 216, 141 N.E.2d 156 (1957).
54 Day, Treadmill to Confusion-Ohio's Guest Statute, 8 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 170
(1957).
55 See note 8 supra.
56 See accompanying text to notes 19-25 supra.
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EQUAL PROTECTION
In the past, most state courts which addressed themselves to ie
question of the equal protection guarantee as it relates to guest statutes
58
have cited Silver5 7 as a bar to such a suit. However, Silver can be
distinguished as outmoded in its 40-year-old emphasis upon the uniqueness
of automobiles and out of focus in its treatment of the guest statute as
merely one of many automobile regulatory devices which had developed
during the 1920's.5 9 Furthermore, the Silver rationale is vulnerable in that
the Court confined its decision solely to the categorical distinction between
60
vehicular guests and guests in all other conveyances, thereby ignoring
legislatively created discriminations between the various subclasses of
vehicular guests, e.g., in a stopped car and in a moving car.
While the fourteenth amendment does not prohibit classifications, it
6
does require that persons similarly situated receive equal treatment. '
in
protection
equal
of
standards
two
applied
Courts have traditionally
examining the validity of legislative acts: the "strict scrutiny test" and
"the rational relation test." The "strict scrutiny test" was defined in the
62
classic decision by Justice Douglas in Harperv. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
wherein it was held that where the legislative enactment involved a suspect
6
classification 63 or a fundamental right, 4 any infringement must be
carefully scrutinized. As a result, the "strict scrutiny test" is only applied
6'
in so-called "suspect classifications" and/or "fundamental rights" cases.
As to the less restrictive "rational relation test" the United States
Supreme Court recently held: "A classification must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair
57 See note 15 supra.
5s For additional examples see Pringle v. Gibson, 195 A. 695 (Me. 1937); State v.
King, 188 A. 775 (Me. 1936); Perozzi v. Ganiere, 149 Ore. 330, 40 P.2d 1009 (1935);
Sleeper v. Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Co., 283 Mass. 511, 186 N.E. 778
(1933); Commonwealth v. Reardon, 282 Mass. 345, 185 N.E. 40 (1933).
59 The Silver court expressly stated: "The use of the automobile as an instrument of
transportation is peculiarly the subject of regulation. We cannot assume that there are
no evils to be corrected or permissible social objects to be gained by the present
statute." 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929).
60 Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117,123 (1929).
6lLindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911); U.S. CoNsT. amend.
XIV. See generally GuNTHER AND DOWLING, CONSTrrtrIONAL LAW 983-1049 (8th ed.
1970).
62 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
(alienage); Douglas v.
63 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (wealth); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall)
36 (1873) (race).
64
See, e.g., Kramer v. Union School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (right to vote);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68 (1968) (rights of illegitimate children); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942) (right to procreate).
65 See notes 62, 63, and 64 supra. See also, Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972, Term,
87 Hutv. L. REv. 121 (1973).
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and substantial relation to the object of the legislation so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."66 Under this "rational
relation test," the equal protection guarantee is thus violated when a
statute places people into different classes on the basis of a criteria which
is unrelated to the objective of the statute.

67

In overturning their guest

7
69
statutes, the supreme courts of California, Kansas, and North Dakota "
employed the "rational relation test." These three courts applied this test to
the two often-quoted objectives of guest statutes: protection of hospitality
7
and the elimination of collusive suits. ' The courts had to determine
whether either objective constituted a rationale basis for the differential
treatment resulting from the classification scheme of their guest statutes,
such as, "guests" as opposed to "passenger for payment"; "automobile
68

guests" as opposed to "other recipients of generosity"; guests injured
as opposed
while "in the vehicles, during a ride upon a public highway,"
' 72
to "automobile guests injured in other circumstances.
PROTECTION OF HOSPITALITY
In examining the hospitality objective the North Dakota Supreme
Court found no realistic purpose to support the distinction between

73
automobile guests and other recipients of generosity. Similarly, the
74

Brown court analogized the precedent set in Rowland v. Christian,
which held that hosts must exercise reasonable care not to injure a social
guest. The court reasoned that since state law requires that hosts generally
owe a duty of ordinary care to their guests, the failure of the guest statute
to provide a similar duty where automobile guests were concerned created
75
an arbitrary discrimination between classes of guests. The Brown court
66 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971). For later cases applying this standard,

see Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
67 Id. See also Forbush v. Wallace, 405 U.S. 970 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972); Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAv. L REv. 1 (1972).
68 Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d at 861, 506 P.2d at 216, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 391 (1973).
09 Henry v. Bauder, 518 P.2d at 365-366 (Kan. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Henry].
70Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d at 775-776 (N.D. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
Johnson].
(hospitality);
71 See, e.g., Clarke v. Storchak, 384 I1. 564, 52 N.E.2d 229 (1944)
Bailey v. Resner, 168 Kan. 439, 214 P.2d 323 (1950) (collusion); Hasbrook v.
Wingate, 152 Ohio St. 50, 87 N.E.2d 87 (1949) (hospitality); Thomas v. Herron, 20
Ohio St. 2d 62, 253 N.E.2d 772 (1969) (collusion). See also text accompanying notes
19-25 supra.
72
See, e.g., former CAL.VEH.CODE § 17158 (West 1971) as analyzed in this regard in
Brown v. Merlo, beginning at 8 Cal. 3d at 863, 506 P.2d at 217, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
73
Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771, 778 (N.D. 1974) (the notion that it is
improper to allow a guest to sue for ordinary negligence is not applied to any other
host-guest relationship).
74 69 Cal. 2d 108,443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
75 Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d at 865, 506 P.2d at 219, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 395 (1973)
(when a landlord undertook any "active operation" he bore a duty to exercise due
care towards trespassers, licensees and invitees alike).
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concluded that however laudable the motives of a hospitable host or
however generous his charity, it is irrational to reward that generosity by
subjecting beneficiaries to a greater risk of uncompensated injury than is
faced -by other individuals. 7 As the Kansas Supreme Court pointed out,
today's universal existence of personal liability insurance coverage
eliminates the personal nature of a suit for damages and thus removes
any inherent ingratitude in suing the host driver. 77 Under the abovementioned principles, courts are now holding that the guest statute's
"hospitality" classification scheme is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable
and therefore inconsistent with the dictates of the fourteenth amendment. 78
COLLUSION
In addressing the second proffered rationale justifying automobile
guest statutes, courts have likewise concluded that this classification is
unreasonable. While admitting that a small segment of automobile guests
might file collusive lawsuits, the Brown court asserted that as written, their
guest statute presented a classic case of an impermissibly overinclusive
classification scheme, i.e., the statute's classification imposed "a burden
upon a wider range of individuals than are included in the class of those
tainted with the mischief at which the law aims." 79 As the North Dakota
Court reasoned:
A Guest Statute is no final answer to collusion. It is still possible for
the dishonest to fabricate evidence to support the higher degree of
fault required by the statute. As one example, it would be simple for
a colluding host and guest to assert that payment had been made
for the transportation or that the driver was intoxicated. In other
cases we rely upon the standard remedy of perjury, the efficacy of
cross examination, the availability of pre-trial discovery, and the
good sense of juries to detect false testimony if it should occur. We
do not withdraw the remedy from all injured persons in order to
avoid a rare recovery based on false testimony.80
The Brown Court analogized the situation to that of the California
doctrine concerning family immunity. Members of a family are not
precluded from bringing suit against each other merely because of the
possibility of collusion. Consistently, the court reasoned that "it is
unreasonable to eliminate causes of action of an entire class of persons
simply because some undefined portion of a designated class may file
fraudulent lawsuits."1 In any event, collusive suits seem more likely
Id. at 871, 506 P.2d at 223, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
Henry v. Bauder, 518 P.2d 362, 369-370 (Kan. 1974).
781d. at 371; Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d at 779; Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d at
867, 506 P.2d at 221, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
79 Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d at 876, 506 P.2d at 227, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 403,
80 Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771, 778 (N.D. 1974) (emphasis added).
81 Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d at 875, 506 P.2d at 226, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 402,
76

77
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with family members as opposed to a host and guest in an automobile.
Since members of a family can sue other members of the same family,
there is neither a practical nor a compelling reason why a guest should
be precluded from recovering from his automobile host driver.
Finally, the Brown court analyzed the statutory exceptions in the
guest statute and pointed out:
The numerous statutory exceptions in the guest statute-making a
guest's recovery turn on the mobility or immobility of the vehicle,
the physical location of the guest in or outside the car or the physical
location of the vehicle on the private or public highway--similarly
82
bear "no discernible relationship" to the realities of life.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE OHIO STATUTE
To this writer, it is difficult to dispute the fact that the Ohio
automobile guest statute appears unconstitutional when analyzed in light
of the recent guest statute decisions. Under Ohio statutory authority,
"guests or business invitees are owed a duty of reasonable care by the
83
owner or occupier of premises." However, in Ohio, as was the case in
California, Kansas, and North Dakota, automobile guests receive different
treatment than other social guests. While the legislature may enact laws in
extent
derogation of the common law, the legislature is restrained to the
84
that it must not act in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner. As the
ensuing discussion will demonstrate, under the equal protection "rational
relation test," as applied to the proffered objectives of protecting hospi-3
tality and preventing fraud and collusion, the Ohio guest statute fails.'
Today, nine out of ten licensed drivers in Ohio have liability
insurance.83 The typical guest statute case is that of the driver who offers
his friend a ride to work or invites him out to dinner, and negligently
drives him into a collision. The driver and his insurance company hide
behind the statute and step out of the picture while the guest is left
alone to bear the loss. In the words of Professor Prosser: "[i]f this is
87
good social policy, it at least appears under a novel front." And as
liability
personal
mentioned earlier, with the advent of almost universal
83
driver.
host
the
suing
in
"ingratitude"
coverage there is less

82 Id. at 882, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 407, 506 P.2d at 231.
3Omio REv. CODE ANN. § 4561.15.1 (Page 1953).

Ohio St. 2d 131, 267 N.E.2d 318 (1971);
Vest, a minor v. Kramer, 158 Ohio St. 78, 107 N.E.2d 105 (1952); Miller v. Fairley,
84See, e.g., Fleischman v. Flowers, 25

141 Ohio St. 327, 48 N.E.2d 217 (1943).

85 See accompanying text to notes 66-72 supra.
88 U.S. Dept. of Transportation, FEDERAL CASUALTY AND SURETY BULLETrN 3 (1973).
87 PROSSER, supra note 19 at 187.

88 See accompanying text to notes 76 and 77 supra.
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In Avellone v. St. John's Hospital 9 the Ohio Supreme Court overturned the charitable immunity doctrine, noting that the prevalence of
liability insurance helped change this public policy. The Court reasoned:
The law's emphasis ordinarily is on liability.... The rule of ordinary
immunity is out of step with the general trend of legislative and
judicial policy in distributing losses incurred by individuals through
the operation of an enterprise among all who benefit by it rather than
in leaving them wholly to be borne by those who sustain them. 90
As in Brown, Henry, and Johnson, one would expect the Ohio Supreme
Court to refute the "hospitality" rationale of the guest statute.
In declaring its guest statute unconstitutional the California court had
the benefit of having its state courts previously reject the "collusive suit
rationale" in overturning its family immunity doctrine. 91 Although Ohio
has maintained its family immunity doctrine on the rationale of avoiding
collusion between family members, 92 as between driver and guest, such
rationale is not persuasive for two reasons. First, there is less of a
fiduciary relationship between driver and guest. Second, the host driver
and guest passenger need only state that compensation in some form
was rendered to circumvent the statute. As an Ohio judge once observed:
The argument that the difference in Guest Statute liability as between
paying and non-paying occupants of motor vehicles is necessary to
prevent fraud seems patently to shift the fraudulent potential from
bogus liability to pretended payments. Obviously, the latter has the
greater susceptibility to mendacious manipulation because it can be
contrived with no chance whatever for third party witnesses to
be present or objective facts to be adduced, a point reflecting the
capricious nature of the distinction. 93
Apparently then, the assertion of payment by the guest and the driver
presents a simple and totally effective method of avoiding the application
of the provisions of the guest statute. Further, parties denied recovery by
the guest statute would logically only include those whose sense of fair
play and honesty would inherently contradict the collusiveness rationale.
As pointed out in Klein: "It would be a sad commentary on the law
if we were to admit that the judicial processes are so ineffective that we
must deny relief to a person otherwise entitled simply because in some
future case a litigant may be guilty of fraud or collusion."' '
89 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956).
90 Id. at 476-77, 135 N.E.2d at 416.
91 See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962)

[hereinafter cited as Klein].
92 See Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243,208 N.E.2d 533 (1965).
93
Roetzel v. Fortune, Case No. 31211 (Cuyahoga County Ct. App. 1973) (Day, J.,
dissenting).
94 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70,26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962),
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Courts in states having no guest statute have refused to apply the
guest act of another state.95 In the words of one state's chief justice:
Finally, we conclude that our rule is preferable to that of Vermont.
The automobile guest statutes were enacted in about half the states,
in the 1920's and early 1930's as a result of vigorous pressure by
skillful proponents. Legislative persuasion was largely in terms of
guest relationships (hitchhikers) and uninsured personal liabilities
that are no longer characteristic of our automotive society.... The
problems of automobile accident laws then were not what they are
today. New Hampshire never succumbed to this persuasion. No
American state has newly adopted a guest statute for many years.
Courts of states which did adopt them are today construing them
much more narrowly, evidencing their dissatisfaction with them...
though still on the books, they contradict the spirit of the times.96
In fact, no automobile guest statutes have been enacted since 1939.9
One must ponder the question of whether such statutes were a product
of a particular era, and are no longer needed. As this discussion has
hopefully demonstrated, current case law strongly supports the contention
that automobile guests statutes are an unconstitutional denial of the
equal protection of the laws.
Presently, a case challenging the constitutionality of the Ohio guest
statute is docketed before the Ohio Supreme Court. 98 Although the court
may well defer to -the legislature on this issue, it appears to have enough
cogent and convincing rationale at its disposal to put the Ohio Guest
Statute to rest in an era which certainly must regard it as an anachronism.
ALEX SHUMATE

Eg., Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966). For other cases declining
to enforce the guest laws of other states, see Kopp v. Rechtzegel, 273 Minn. 441, 141
N.W.2d 526 (1966); Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967); Babcock
v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d (1963); Wilcox v. Wilcox,
26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
96 Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 358, 222 A.2d 205, 210 (1966).
91 See Comment, Judicial Nullification of Guest Statutes, 41 S. CAL. L. Rav. 884,
889-901 (1968).
9s Berisford v. Sells, Case No. 74-307 (Ohio Supreme Ct., filed April 4, 1974).
95
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